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Abstract 
Traditional police–suspect interviews differ from intelligence interviews in several 
important ways, and these differences merit new research activities. This article presents 
an overview of recent and innovative research into eliciting infor- mation and cues to 
deceit in intelligence interviews, and discusses research into new domains including 
‘lying about intentions’, ‘undercover interviewing’, and ‘collective interviewing’. 
Although that research is still in its infancy, the findings reveal that truth tellers’ and 
liars’ answers can be distinguished from each other if the correct interview protocols are 
implemented, such as asking unexpected questions and introducing forced turn-taking. In 
addition, this new research also shows that the so-called Scharff tech- nique is more 
effective for eliciting human intelligence information compared with more traditional 
techniques.  
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Eliciting Information and Detecting Lies in Intelligence Interviewing:  
An Overview Of Recent Research 
 Traditionally, forensic deception research focuses on police– suspect interviews 
(Evans et al., in press; Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Although 
interest re- mains in this area, researchers increasingly examine informa- tion elicitation 
and deception detection in intelligence interviews. There are many differences between 
traditional police–suspect interviews and intelligence interviews. These differences merit 
new research activities, as much of the police–suspect deception research does not 
adequately ad- dress the various settings and factors that are relevant for intel- ligence 
efforts (Brandon, 2011; Evans, Meissner, Brandon, Russano, & Kleinman, 2010; Loftus, 
2011; Redlich, Kelly, & Miller, in press; Russano, Narchet, & Kleinman, in press; 
Russano, Narchet, Kleinman, & Meissner, in press). 
 In this article, we concentrate on three differences between traditional police–
suspect and intelligence interviews that have attracted research to date. We will review 
this research and summarise its findings. First, police–suspect interviews typically focus 
on lying about past activities. However, in relation to serious threats and terrorism, being 
able to discriminate between true and false accounts about future ac- tivities (e.g., 
intentions) is of paramount importance, as this addresses the issue of preventing criminal 
acts from occur- ring, including terrorist attacks. We will discuss this lying about 
intentions research. Second, police–suspect interviews are formal overt interviews that 
take place in a custodial set- ting. The threat of terrorism has led to an increased emphasis 
on the detection of deception in public spaces including country borders, security 
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checkpoints, airports, bus termi- nals, train stations, shopping malls, and sport venues 
(Cooke & Winner, 2008; Driskell, Salas, & Driskell, 2012; Kimery, 2008). In such 
situations, investigators, and particularly those who are working in an undercover 
capacity, sometimes have good reason not to tell the interviewees that the ‘chat’ they 
have with them is, in fact, an interview. If interviewees would become aware that they are 
interviewed, it may reveal the undercover agent’s identity and/or the interviewee might 
decide to fabricate information that might jeopardise a much larger operation. 
Alternatively, if an interviewee is aware that she or he is on the intelligence service’ 
radar, it may hamper future investigation regarding this interviewee and/or the group she 
or he belongs to. For this reason, researchers have started to conduct deception research 
where undercover inter- viewers elicit information without the interviewee’ awareness. 
We will discuss this undercover interviewing research. A third difference is that terrorist 
acts are often planned and executed by groups rather than individuals (Crenshaw, 1990; 
Soufan, 2011). For example, the terrorists travelled together to London to carry out the 
London 2005 bombings (official-documents. gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087). 
Consequently, re- searchers have started to conduct research involving groups of truth 
tellers and liars who are interviewed together (collectively). We will discuss this 
collective interviewing research. 
 In intelligence interviews, it can be valuable to obtain information from suspects 
without them realising that they gave valuable information. This brings us to Hanns 
Joachim Scharff, a German interrogator of the German Luftwaffe (air force) in World 
War II (Toliver, 1997). Scharff’s task was to interrogate American and British fighter 
pilots who were shot down and captured during their sorties over Europe. Those pilots 
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generally liked to be interviewed by Scharff, as he was perceived as a real gentleman who 
did not put much pressure on them and with whom they thought they ‘just had a chat’ 
(Toliver, 1997). The same Scharff was very much liked by his German employers, as he 
extracted more valuable infor- mation from these pilots than many of his colleagues. 
Scharff’s skill was to extract valuable information from his interviewees without them 
being aware that they pro- vided that information. Scharff, who was married to an British 
woman, gave lectures in the USA about his interrogation technique after World War II, 
but only re- cently have researchers begun to examine his technique. We will present the 
first findings of this research into the Scharff technique. 
Lying about intentions 
 In recent years, psycho-legal scholars have started to conduct research on true and 
false intentions. Later, we will organise and present the efforts made so far. After 
introducing some pioneering work, we will review three stands of research: (i) 
unanticipated questions; (ii) anticipated questions; and (iii) strategic use of evidence 
(SUE). The first two strands are for situations where the interviewer does not have 
background information on the person questioned, and the third strand is for situations 
where there is such background information available (evidence). 
 Vrij, Granhag, Mann, and Leal (2011) conducted a study at an international 
airport using passengers as participants. Truth tellers were instructed to answer all 
interview ques- tions about their forthcoming trip truthfully. Liars were instructed to 
answer questions on their destination truthfully but were told to lie when answering 
questions about the purpose of their trip. Results showed an overall detection accuracy of 
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truths and lies of approximately 70%. In a follow-up study, the same team compared the 
deception detection accuracy for statements of intent and statements on past behaviour 
(Vrij et al., 2011). Military and police officers were given a mission to collect and deliver 
a pack- age. Intention related interviews were conducted before they began their mission, 
and interviews about their past actions were conducted after the mission was completed. 
Partici- pants were interviewed a total of four times, twice on their intentions and twice 
on their past actions. In half of the inter- views, they lied, and in the other half, they told 
the truth. Corroborating the findings of Vrij et al. (2011), the results showed an overall 
truth and lie accuracy of approximately 70% with regard to intentions. Regarding past 
activities, an overall truth and lie accuracy of approximately 55% was found, a 
percentage typically found in lie detection about past activities (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
These pioneering studies suggest that lies about intentions are detectable, but they offer 
little guidance in terms of theory or strategic questioning in order to elicit cues to deceit. 
Unanticipated questions 
 A consistent finding in the deception literature is that liars prepare themselves for 
anticipated interviews. They do so by preparing possible answers to questions they expect 
to be asked (Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004; Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Jonsson, 2003; Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007; Vrij et al., 2009). This strategy of 
preparing answers for possible questions makes sense. Planning makes lying easier, and 
planned lies typically con- tain fewer cues to deceit than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 
2003). However, preparing will be fruitful only if liars correctly anticipate which 
questions will be asked. Investiga- tors can exploit this limitation by asking unanticipated 
ques- tions. Although liars can refuse to answer unanticipated questions by saying ‘I 
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don’t know’ or ‘I can’t remember’, such responses will create suspicion if these questions 
are about central aspects of the target event. A liar, therefore, has little option other than 
to fabricate a plausible answer on the spot, which is cognitively demanding. For liars, ex- 
pected questions should be easier to answer than unanticipated questions, because liars 
can give their planned and rehearsed answers to the expected questions, but they need to 
fabricate answers to the unexpected questions. The difference liars experience in 
cognitive load while answering these two sets of questions should become evident in 
their verbal responses. In contrast, the levels of cognitive load that truth tellers experience 
while answering anticipated and unanticipated questions should not be too different from 
each other, and they should produce more comparable answers to the anticipated and 
unanticipated questions than liars. 
 There are many reasons for why a particular question posed during an interview 
will be perceived as unanticipated. First, the question may target a domain that the 
interviewee anticipates to be questioned about (e.g., a forthcoming trip) but stretches 
beyond the set of questions she or he is expecting to be asked (e.g., about transportation 
from the airport). Second, the question may target a domain that is unanticipated (e.g., the 
planning phase of the forthcoming trip where the stated intentions were formed). 
Research on both these types of unanticipated questions will be reviewed later. In 
connection to this, one should note that there is at least one other form of unanticipated 
question that can be useful in deception detection contexts. That is, where the question as 
such is expected (‘Can you please describe the restaurant where you had dinner last 
night!’), but where the response format is unanticipated (‘Please make a sketch of the 
restaurant?’) (for an example, see Vrij et al., 2009). 
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 Warmelink, Vrij, Mann and Granhag (in press), Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi 
and Granhag (2012) exam- ined the effects of asking unanticipated questions about the 
stated intentions. In brief, truth tellers and liars were interviewed about an alleged 
forthcoming trip. Anticipated questions about the purpose of the trip (e.g., ‘What is the 
main purpose of your trip?’) were followed by, which a pilot study indicated, 
unanticipated questions about transport (e. g., ‘How are you going to travel to your 
destination?’), plan- ning (‘What part of the trip was easiest to plan?’), and the core event 
(‘Keep in mind an image of the most important thing you are going to do on this trip. 
Please describe this mental image in detail?’). Liars, compared with truth tellers, gave 
significantly more detail to the expected questions and significantly less detail to the 
unexpected questions. 
 Next, we will discuss research on the effects of posing ques- tions that target an 
unanticipated domain. By summarising the work on true and false intentions, it is 
possible to distinguish between three lines of research. The first line examines the effect 
of asking questions about the planning phase. Research by Sooniste, Granhag, Knieps, 
and Vrij (2013) showed that questions about the planning phase are much less anticipated 
than questions about the intentions per se. Furthermore, and in line with the reasoning 
outlined earlier, truth tellers and liars provided similar answers to questions about their 
intentions (anticipated questions) but different answers to questions about the planning 
phase (unanticipated questions), with truth tellers providing more detailed answers to the 
unanticipated questions than liars (Sooniste et al., 2013). 
 In two follow-up studies, this approach has been success- fully extended to small 
cells of suspects. In those studies, small groups of truth tellers plan to carry out a task and 
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are instructed to (if intercepted) answer questions about the task truthfully. Small groups 
of liars plan to carry out an illegal task and are asked to (if intercepted) conceal this in a 
subse- quent interview by pretending that they are about to carry out an innocent task. All 
participants are intercepted before having the chance to carry out their planned tasks, and 
they are all interviewed separately. In essence, questions about the plan- ning phase 
produced larger differences between truth tellers and liars in terms of consistency within 
the groups than ques- tions about intentions (Mac Giolla & Granhag, in press; Sooniste, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, in press). In a recent study, the same team of researchers 
successfully used a memory-enhancing technique (the Cognitive Interview) to fur- ther 
magnify the differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ answers to the unanticipated 
questions targeting the planning phase (Sooniste, Granhag, Vrij, & Strömwall, 2014). 
 The second line of research focuses on the quality of the plans made. In brief, as 
truth tellers are typically more moti- vated to plan their intentions than liars, one may 
predict that they would produce better plans. In line with this assump- tion, Mac Giolla, 
Granhag, and Liu-Jönsson (2013) found more markers of good planning behaviour (e.g., 
effective time allocation, implementation intention related uttering, and likelihood to 
refer to potential problems) in truth tellers’ statements about the future than in liars’ 
statements. Relat- edly, in a recent study, participants were told either that they were to 
partake in an argument creation task (true intention) or that they were to lie about their 
intentions to partake in the task (false intention). Those with a true intention reported to 
had more, and also more distracting, task-related thoughts than those with a false 
intention (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Ask, 2014, Experiment 1). 
 The third line of research concerns the concept of episodic future thought (EFT) 
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and mental images. EFT refers to our ability to pre-experience future events through 
mental simulation, with a strong focus on visual imagery (Szpunar, 2010). In brief, just as 
planning is a typical feature of inten- tions, EFTs are a typical—and often automatic—
feature of planning. Consequently, as truth tellers are more likely to engage in detailed 
planning, it follows that truth tellers should have EFTs related to their intentions to a 
greater extent than liars. In a larger project, Knieps (2013) examined this assumption by 
instructing truth tellers to plan a trip to a nearby shopping mall, while liars used a 
shopping trip as a cover story to mask their criminal intentions. Overall, the basic 
assumption received strong empirical support (e.g., Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Knieps, 
Granhag, & Vrij, 2013a, 2013b). Specifically, self-report measures show that truth tellers 
are much more likely than liars to have EFTs. Translated into an investigate interview 
setting, the series of studies show that more truth tellers than liars report experiencing a 
mental image during the planning phase (Knieps, 2013). Differently put, if the suspect 
did not report having a mental image activated during the planning phase, he or she was 
most likely to be lying about his or her stated intentions. Caution might be warranted, as 
the ability to establish and remember mental images of the future might vary across 
individuals. On the other hand, pre-experiencing the future in the form of mental images 
is a fundamental aspect of human cognition and a normal, day-to-day activity (Schacter, 
Addis, & Buckner, 2008). 
Anticipated questions 
 The work reviewed earlier shows that asking only anticipated questions will make 
it difficult to discriminate between persons telling the truth about their future intentions 
and persons who lie about their future intentions. However, we do not argue that 
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anticipated questions are of no value to dis- criminate between true and false intentions. 
There is research from social cognition on goal-directed behaviour that can be used as the 
basis for predicting differences between statements expressing true and statements 
expressing false intentions. Specifically, Gollwitzer and his colleagues pro- posed the 
theory of implementation intentions that specifies the behaviour that will be performed in 
service of the goal (Gollwitzer, 1999). Particularly significant are the so-called ‘if–then’ 
plans (‘If the butcher is out of beef, I will buy chicken’), that will assist in accomplishing 
goals (e.g., Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005). In essence, implementation 
intentions specify (among other things) how the stated goal will be achieved. Importantly, 
a person who has no intention of pursuing a stated goal is unlikely to form an intention 
implementation that spells out how the goal will be pursued (e.g., Sheeran et al., 2005). 
 In support of this assumption, Sooniste et al. (2013) found that truth tellers’ 
answers were more characterised by information (utterances) pertaining to how the stated 
intention would be reached compared with liars’ answers. In contrast, liars’ answers were 
more characterised by information pertaining to why the stated goal had to be pursued. 
The latter finding was explained by drawing on research showing that persons who have 
decided to lie about their intentions prepare ready-made answers to anticipated questions 
that are geared towards why they have to do what they (falsely) claim that they will do 
(Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013). Research on social cognition may provide 
researchers with new and theoretically sound markers that are worth ex- amining in 
future studies aimed at discriminating between true and false intentions. 
Strategic use of evidence 
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 The SUE technique is an example of a technique emerging from research on 
strategic ways of interrogating suspects in or- der to elicit cues to truth and deception 
(Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Ultimately, the SUE technique rests on the theoretically driven 
assumption that guilty suspects and innocent suspects enter interrogations in a different 
mental state (Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). There is empirical support that these 
different mental states result in diverse strategies with respect to providing critical 
information. In brief, guilty suspects (falsely denying guilt) use more avoidance, 
aversive, or denial strategies, whereas innocent suspects (truthfully denying guilt) neither 
avoid nor escape but use more forthcoming verbal strategies (e.g., Hartwig et al., 2007; 
Kassin, 2005; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). In principle, there are three groups 
of SUE tactics: (i) evidence tactics; (ii) question tactics; and (iii) disclosure tactics 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2015). The evidence tactics are primarily used to assess the 
evidence in the planning phase, the question tactics are used to systemati- cally exhaust 
the alternative explanations that a suspect may have to account for the evidence, and the 
disclosure tactics are used to disclose the evidence in the most effective manner (i.e., to 
maximise the diagnostic value of the evidence). Impor- tantly, all these tactics are derived 
from the conceptual frame- work underlying the SUE technique (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2015; Hartwig et al., 2014). 
 The SUE technique has proven successful in eliciting cues to deception in single 
suspects (Hartwig et al., 2006) and small groups of suspects (Granhag, Rangmar, & 
Strömwall, in press), in adults (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, Wolf, & Vrij, 2011) and 
children (Clemens et al., 2010), as well as for suspects lying about their past actions 
(Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005) and suspects lying about their intentions 
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(Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2011). For a recent review of the empirical findings on 
the SUE technique, including the first meta-analysis of the technique, see Hartwig et al. 
(2014). 
 In sum, although research on true and false intentions is a new area within the 
broader field of ‘deception detection’, it already offers a number of different tactical 
approaches. While it is clear that these approaches need to be developed further, this is 
not the same as arguing that the knowledge obtained from the first wave of studies is 
without practical implications. For example, based on our own extensive travel 
experience, we have the impression that throughout the world, immigration officers 
mainly ask anticipated questions when quizzing passengers at airport border con- trols 
(e.g., questions on the purpose of the trip). In all likeli- hood, they pay attention to the 
amount of detail passengers give, with the richer, more detailed accounts being perceived 
as more believable (e.g., Bell & Loftus, 1989). In brief, and as described earlier, potential 
wrongdoers will be well equipped to answer such questions in detail and subse- quently 
will make an honest impression on immigration officers. The interview protocols used in 
border control work should draw on the fact that criminally inclined individuals rarely 
expect the unexpected. 
UNDERCOVER INTERVIEWING 
 Undercover interviewing can be employed when an investigator does not want the 
interviewee to be known that she or he is being interviewed. Undercover interviewing has 
disadvantages and advantages compared with formal overt interviews. Starting with the 
disadvantages, interview tools that have shown to facilitate lie detection, such as 
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discussing evidence (‘Show me your ticket?’; e.g., Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2007) or imposing cognitive load on interviewees by asking them 
to recall a story in reverse order (‘Please tell me how you went from your home to the 
train station but do that in reverse order so start from here and go back to your home?’; 
e.g., Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Fisher, 2012), cannot be employed without making the suspect 
suspicious about the questioner’s motives. For that reason, long and in-depth interview 
protocols are often not possible either. 
 The advantage of undercover interviewing is that some techniques can be 
introduced that will discriminate between truth tellers and liars that may not work as well 
in overt interviews. These techniques relate to exploiting (i) liars’ tendency to withhold 
information that they believe could be potentially incriminating (Hartwig, Granhag, 
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Hartwig et al., 2005) and (ii) liars’ tendency to be less 
cooperative than truth tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003). Withholding information is related to 
the basic forms of human behaviour avoidance and escape (Carlson, Buskist, & Martin, 
2000; Granhag & Hartwig, 2008). In terms of self-regulation, this is viewed as a manner 
of establishing control—by avoiding the aversive event altogether (Granhag & Hartwig, 
2008). From DePaulo et al.’s meta-analysis of cues to deceit, it emerged that liars are 
typically less cooperative than truth tellers. To explain this, DePaulo and colleagues 
argued that liars often experience more negative affect than truth tellers, and this could 
make them more reluctant to engage in conversations, leading to less cooperation. 
 The undercover interviewer could exploit liars’ tendency to be aversive and/or 
uncooperative by inviting suspects to engage in an apparently innocent activity that 
establishes their presence in a certain place at a certain time. Liars’ tendency to be 
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aversive and/or uncooperative may result in greater reluctance to comply with this 
seemingly innocuous compliance request. Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hope, and Leal (2012) 
tested this assumption. Liars were instructed to run a crime-related reconnaissance 
mission to a nearby island and were further instructed to generate as an innocent cover 
story that they were going to visit the island as a tourist to hide their criminal intentions. 
On arrival at the hovercraft terminal, an undercover agent, acting in the role of either a 
doctoral student or an amateur photographer, approached the liars and asked apparently 
innocuous questions about their forthcoming trip, including whether they would mind 
having a photo taken that he could put up on his website. Actual tourists using the 
hovercraft terminal served as a con- trol group. Significantly fewer liars (60%) than truth 
tellers (81%) gave permission to be photographed. Importantly, participants did not find 
it odd to be approached by the undercover interviewer and did not think his questions 
were odd (as examined in a post-interview questionnaire). In other words, employing an 
undercover interviewer in this way revealed differences between truth tellers and liars, 
and did not raise suspicion. 
 The tendency to be aversive and/or uncooperative can also be exploited in a 
different way. When planning large scale incidents or bombing campaigns, terrorists 
often conduct reconnaissance missions to identify key targets (Soufan, 2011). This may 
include taking photographs of potential target locations. Identifying an effective real-time 
method to distinguish between genuine photographers and those with more sinister intent 
may be beneficial and could avoid instances such as in London where the police asked 
tourists to delete their photos taken as a precautionary counter- terrorist measure (Weaver 
& Dodd, 2009). Undercover interviewing could shed light on whether an individual has 
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criminal intentions, as Jundi, Vrij, Mann, Hillman, and Hope (under review) found. In 
their study, participants were asked to take photographs on a square for tourist or terrorist 
purposes. The ‘terrorists’ were also asked to take pictures for tourist purposes as a cover 
story. On the square, a mime artist was present who comically impersonated people as 
they passed through the square. As the participant was about to leave the square after 
taking their photographs, the mime artist approached the participant and asked if she or 
he had photographed him. If she or he answered ‘yes’, he asked if he could see the 
photograph, and if she or he said ‘no’ or that they weren’t sure, he asked if he could 
check as he thought he was in the background when the participant was taking 
photographs. Results revealed that similar percentages of ‘tourists’ and ‘terrorists’ (74%) 
had taken at least one picture of the mime artist. The difference appeared in the 
willingness to show these pictures to him. Truth tellers (36%) were more likely than liars 
(8%) to tell the mime artist that they had taken a picture of him, and truth tellers (60%) 
were significantly more likely than liars (20%) to allow him to see their photographs. 
 Liars’ avoidance to be linked with incriminating evidence can also be exploited in 
undercover interviews to establish evidence. Liars often view the presence of witnesses 
as potentially incriminating because witnesses can serve as additional information 
sources against which investigators can check the veracity of the liars’ statement 
(Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012, in press). Therefore, a suspect 
could first be interviewed by an under- cover interviewer about an apparently innocuous 
activity. Later on, the suspect could be interviewed about the time period that included 
the interaction with the undercover interviewer by a second interviewer who is aware of 
the undercover interview but does not reveal this knowledge to the suspect. Liars may be 
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more reluctant than truth tellers to report the interaction with the undercover interviewer 
because of their tendency to avoid reporting information that they fear may be potentially 
incriminating. In Jundi, Vrij, Hope, Mann, and Hillman (2013), truth tellers and liars un- 
dertook a mission in a park. They went to the park for different reasons and carried out 
somewhat different activities, but both missions included taking pictures of the animals at 
the animal enclosure. Liars were instructed that if they were asked about their activities, 
they should conceal their true reason for visiting the park and to pretend to visit the park 
for the same reason as truth tellers. At the animal enclosure, truth tellers and liars were 
interviewed by an undercover interviewer posing as a City Council employee who asked 
them about their activities at the animal enclosure and park. After completing the 
mission, participants had a formal overt interview with a second interviewer. When asked 
in the initial free recall question to give a detailed account of the mission, more truth 
tellers (42%) than liars (9%) mentioned the undercover interviewer. When specifically 
asked what they could see from the animal enclosure, again more truth tellers (17%) than 
liars (0%) spontaneously mentioned the undercover interviewer. Because taking pictures 
of the animals (the activity the participants carried out when approached by the 
undercover interviewer) was both part of the truth tellers’ and liars’ missions, liars could 
have been honest and could have said that they had spoken to someone at the animal 
encounter, yet they were reluctant to do so. 
 In sum, the undercover studies carried out to date showed that liars are more 
aversive and/or more uncooperative than truth tellers. Which of these two tendencies 
(being aversive or uncooperative) explains the results best is impossible to de- cipher 
from the research findings available to date, because both tendencies predict the same 
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outcome. Further research could shed light on how to explain the current set of results. 
This, however, does not take away that liars’ tendency to be aversive and/or 
uncooperative can be easily demonstrated in undercover interviews. Perhaps, a reason 
why it can be easily demonstrated is that liars, being unaware that they are interviewed, 
do not attempt to mask their tendency to be aver- sive or uncooperative. This may be 
different in overt inter- views. Liars may fear that being aversive or uncooperative looks 
suspicious (Strömwall, Granhag, & Hartwig, 2004) and therefore may be more 
cooperative in overt interviews than in undercover interviews. 
COLLECTIVE INTERVIEWING 
 People often commit crimes or carry out reconnaissance missions in groups 
(Crenshaw, 1990; Soufan, 2011). In police–suspect interviews, suspects are typically 
interviewed individually and immediately separated from their group members (Kassin & 
Gudjonsson, 2004). This is reflected in deception research. The number of studies that 
have exam- ined groups of truth tellers and liars is small, but in these studies, the group 
members are typically interviewed separately (Granhag et al., 2003; Meijer, Bente, Ben- 
Shakhar, & Schumacher, 2013; Meijer, Smulders, & Merckelbach, 2010; Vrij et al., 
2009). In intelligence settings, there are situations whereby it would be more suit- able, 
timely, and convenient to interview group members simultaneously, for example, at 
border check points where cars containing several people are checked. Interviewing 
suspects collectively has as an advantage that investigators can pay attention to 
communication cues (how do the suspects interact with each other), which contain 
potential signs of deceit. 
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When pairs of truth tellers recall a jointly experienced event, they may communicate 
substantially with each other in an attempt to collectively recall all the details they know 
(e.g., transaction information search; Hollingshead, 1998). They therefore may add 
information to each other’s stories, make corrections or interpret each other, or pose 
questions to one another to tap into the other’s memory domain. In contrast, liars will not 
have a joint experience to recall. They may provide their prepared answers to anticipated 
questions, or if the questions were not anticipated, one person may take the lead and the 
other person may simply agree with what is said. This is a far less interactive approach 
than the truth tellers’ approach. Indeed, in the three collective interviewing experiments 
to date, the pairs of liars made fewer additions, corrections, and interruptions than the 
pairs of truth tellers, and posed more questions to each other (Driskell et al., 2012; Jundi, 
Vrij, Hope, Mann, & Hillman, 2013; Vrij, Mann et al., 2012). Also, because truth tellers 
communicate more with each other, they also tend to gaze more at each other and less at 
the interviewer than liars do (Jundi, Vrij, Mann, et al., in press). 
 In the UK, one way to obtain British citizenship is to marry a British citizen. 
Sometimes, a non-British citizen tries to exploit this by setting up a sham marriage with a 
British citizen who may get paid for this service. In order to assess whether marriages are 
real or a sham, in the UK, couples are interviewed simultaneously as part of the 
procedure. Communication cues have the potential to discriminate between truth tellers 
and liars. Transactive memory theory proposes that people in close relationships have a 
specialised memory system or ‘division of labour’ for encoding, storing, and retrieving 
information (Hollingshead, 1998; Wegner, 1987). People who are actually in a close 
relationship know what they are to remember as well as what the other person in the 
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relationship is to remember. This becomes evident when they discuss jointly experienced 
events, and as a result, compared with fictitious couples, real couples pose more 
questions to one another to check or find out information (e.g., ‘Was I working that 
day?’), handing over remembering responsibility more (e.g., ‘You remember this better 
than me, why don’t you explain it’; ‘Do you want to explain this? I know you like telling 
this story’), and finishing each other’s sentences more (e.g., one member starts saying 
‘We went on the banana boat and...’, the second member continues ‘...and we fell off into 
the cold water’). 
 Vernham, Vrij, Mann, Leal, and Hillman (2014) tested the transactive memory 
theory in a lie detection context. In their experiment, truth tellers were real couples who 
had been in a relationship for at least 1year and cohabiting. Lying pairs were friends who 
pretended to be in a relation- ship for at least 1year and cohabiting. All couples were 
interviewed together about their ‘real’ or ‘fictitious’ relation- ship. It was found that 
truth-telling pairs posed questions to one another, provided cues to one another, handed 
over remembering responsibility, and finished each others’ sentences significantly more 
than lying pairs, supporting the idea that real couples have a transactive memory system, 
unlike pretend couples. Based on the finishing each other sentences cue in particular, 
many truth tellers (84%) and liars (91%) were classified correctly. 
 Collective interviews are further suitable for implementing an ‘imposing 
cognitive load’ interview technique, such as ‘forced turn taking’. When recalling 
information as a pair or group, the group members interact with each other resulting in a 
naturally occurring turn-taking pattern—the pattern in which one person speaks then 
stops, and then another person continues then stops, etc. (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 
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1974). Forced turn-taking occurs when the interviewer stops whichever a member of the 
pair was recalling after a short period of time (say 15 seconds) and then asks the other 
member in the pair to continue from the point in which their partner was stopped. Forced 
turn-taking is cognitively demanding because it takes away members’ ability to choose 
who an- swers each of the questions, removing the effects of any dominant characters 
who tend to speak more frequently (Hung et al., 2007), and removes any retrieval 
strategy adopted by the pairs (Basden, Basden, Bryner, & Thomas, 1997). Finally, 
interrupting somebody’s turn has been found to violate the natural flow of recall, increase 
anxiety, and inhibit the ability of the individual to then continue with their turn (Coates, 
2004). 
 In Vernham et al.’s (2014) forced turn-taking experiment, truth tellers were real 
couples who had been in relationship for at least 1 year and cohabiting, whereas lying 
pairs were friends who pretended to be in a relationship for at least 1year and cohabiting. 
All ‘couples’ were interviewed together in their pairs about their real or fictitious 
relation- ship. Truth-telling pairs were more likely to continue the story after being told to 
turn-take, whereas lying pairs more often repeated what their partner last said before 
continuing. In addition, lying pairs waited before speaking after being told to turn-take 
significantly more than truth-telling pairs. Liars’ tendency to wait longer before 
answering and, when they started speaking, to first repeat what their partner has said 
makes clear that they found forced turn-taking more difficult than truth tellers. 
 In sum, although only a few collective interviewing deception studies have been 
carried out to date, the findings of these studies revealed that collective interview has 
poten- tial to become a successful method to detect deceit. Members of truth-telling 
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groups communicate more with each other than members of lying groups when asked to 
jointly recall an event, and truth tellers handle the request to turn-take smoother than liars 
do. 
THE SCHARFF TECHNIQUE 
 The gathering of human intelligence (HUMINT) is at the core of both traditional 
law enforcement work and efforts aimed at countering terrorism. Human intelligence is 
one of many different forms of intelligence, and it is perhaps best described as the 
gathering of information by means of an interaction between two or more individuals 
(e.g., Justice, Bhatt, Brandon & Kleinman, 2010). Hence, one would expect to find 
guidance from modern psychological research on how to effectively gather human 
intelligence, but this is not the case. In fact, the body of modern research on techniques 
aimed at gathering human intelligence is very meagre. Granhag and his colleagues set out 
to remedy this and have recently completed the first series of studies exam- ining the 
comparative effectiveness of human intelligence gathering techniques. Specifically, they 
compared the so- called Scharff technique against the Direct Approach technique. The 
Scharff technique draws on principles used by Hanns Scharff, the highly successful 
interrogator working for the German Luftwaffe during World War II (Toliver, 1997). In 
brief, the Scharff technique, as tested in the studies cited later, is conceptualised into four 
different tactics (Granhag, 2010): (i) a friendly approach; (ii) not pressing for 
information; (iii) playing on the ‘illusion of already knowing it all’; and (iv) working with 
confirmations/disconfirmations (instead of asking direct questions). The Direct Approach 
is based on a combination of open-ended and specific questions, and is recommended as 
the standard technique by the U.S. Army Field Manual (FM 2–22.3, Human Intelligence 
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Collec- tor Operations). Recent surveys confirm that the Direct Approach is indeed one 
of the most commonly used human intelligence gathering techniques (e.g., Redlich, 
Kelly, & Miller, 2011). 
 All studies cited later employed an experimental paradigm in- troduced by 
Granhag, Cancino Montecinos, and Oleszkiewicz (2013), mirroring some central features 
of a typical HUMINT interaction. In essence, each participant (source) received in- 
complete information about an upcoming terrorist attack and was instructed to appear 
cooperative in a forthcoming interview. They were instructed to achieve this by striking a 
balance be- tween not revealing too much but also not too little information in the 
interview. 
 The studies show promising results in favour of the Scharff technique. First, the 
sources interviewed with the Scharff tech- nique reveal more new information compared 
with the sources interviewed with the Direct Approach (e.g., Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & 
Kleinman, in press; May, Granhag, & Oleszkiewicz, 2014, when combining the two 
versions of the Scharff technique). Second, the sources interviewed with the Scharff 
technique were less accurate in establishing which in- formation the interviewer was after 
(e.g., Granhag et al., 2013; May et al., 2014). Third, the studies show that a large majority 
of the sources interviewed by the Scharff technique believed they had revealed less new 
information than was actually the case, whereas the majority of the sources interviewed 
with the Direct Approach believed they had revealed more new in- formation than was 
actually the case (Oleszkiewicz, Granhag, & Cancino Montecinos, in press; Oleszkiewicz 
et al., in press; May et al., 2014). In other words, the Scharff technique leads the source to 
underestimate how much new information she or he revealed during the interview, 
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whereas the Direct Approach leads the source to overestimate how much new 
information she or he revealed. A source underestimating how much information she or 
he revealed during the interac- tion is an important indicator of an effective human 
intelligence gathering technique and was the trademark of Hanns Scharff’s technique 
(Toliver, 1997). Importantly, in a recent study, Granhag, Oleszkiewicz, and Kleinman 
(2014) showed that the aforementioned findings also hold for (i) sources who are more or 
less willing to provide information during an interview and (ii) sources who hold more or 
less information (i.e., sources who are more or less capable of providing information). 
 In sum, the first series of studies showed that the Scharff technique is a promising 
tool for gathering information in intelligence settings. However, we would like to point 
out that this strand of research is still in its infancy and that more research is required to 
obtain a full picture of the success of the technique. We believe that future research on 
different aspects of the Scharff technique, and using a more diverse sample of 
participants and scenarios, will make the picture more complete. 
CONCLUSION 
 In this article, we argued that traditional police–suspect inter- views differ from 
intelligence interviews in several important ways and that these differences merit new 
research activities, as much of the current deception research literature does not 
adequately address the various settings and factors that are relevant for terrorism. We 
discussed numerous strands of innovative research in various new domains, including 
lying about intentions, undercover interviewing, and collective interviewing. Research 
activities in these strands of research are still in their infancy, but the results of the studies 
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consis- tently reveal that differences between truth tellers and liars emerge in intelligence 
interviews if the appropriate interview protocols are used, such as the unexpected 
questions approach, forced turn-taking, and the Scharff technique. We hope that 
this article will inspire academics in their thinking about how to effectively interview 
suspects in intelligence interviews, and we encourage these academics to carry out 
research in this important and innovative line of interviewing. 
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